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Abstract 
In this paper, an analysis of the vulnerability of the Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical 
transmission network (HVIET) is carried out for the identification of the groups of links (or edges, 
or arcs) most critical considering the network structure and flow. Betweenness centrality and 
network connection efficiency variations are considered as measures of the importance of the 
network links. The search of the most critical ones is carried out within a multi-objective 
optimization problem aimed at the maximization of the importance of the groups and minimization 
of their dimension. The problem is solved by using a genetic algorithm. The analysis is based only 
on information on the topology of the network and leads to the identification of the most important 
single component, couples of components, triplets and so forth. The comparison of the results 
obtained with those reported by previous analyses indicates that the proposed approach provides 
useful complementary information.  
Keywords: genetic algorithm, multi-objective optimization, network performance measure, power 
system vulnerability 
1. Introduction 
Societies are heavily dependent on many systems of distributed service, the so called 
infrastructures, e.g. computer and communication systems [Cohen et al., 2000], electric power 
transmission and distribution systems [Dobson et al., 2007], rail and road transportation systems 
[Zheng et al., 2007], constituted by networks of components. Such infrastructures are becoming 
more and more interconnected with each other, and therefore interdependent and potentially more 
vulnerable with respect to faults or malicious attacks: a random failure or an intentional attack in 
any of these complex networks may easily propagate across the network, increasing and multiplying 
its effects.  
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These systems need priority protection, as specified by a number of national and transnational 
directives [CNIP, 2006], [Birchmeier, 2007]. The implementation of these directives and programs 
calls for the establishment of proper frameworks of vulnerability analysis for designing the 
adequate protections against failures and attacks [CNIP, 2006], [Rocco et al., 2007], [Vulnerability 
ESREL, 2007].  
In order to protect a large-scale critical infrastructure, the Decision-Maker (DM) must be able to 
assess what elements are critical, that is what elements affect the system performance the most. 
From a topological viewpoint, various measures of the importance of a network element (edge or 
node), i.e., of the relevance of its location in the network with respect to a given topological 
indicator, can be introduced. The term „importance‟ is then intended to qualify the role that the 
presence and location of the element plays with respect to the average global and local connection 
properties of the whole network. 
In the case of electrical power systems, the existing literature on vulnerability analysis largely takes 
a topological approach to identify the critical components in the network [Albert et al., 2004], 
[Crucitti et al., 2005], [Zio et al., 2008]. Such analyses are capable of identifying elements of 
structural vulnerability, i.e. network edges and nodes whose failure can induce a severe structural 
damage to the network through the physical disconnection of its parts. Such analysis is very fast 
from a computational point of view and only requires the information of the topology of the 
network. 
On the contrary, this kind of analysis is limited by the fact that it focuses only on the topological 
features of the network, thus neglecting its physical characteristics. In this respect, it is important to 
verify the extent of these limitations and possibly overcome them by additional more detailed 
physical analyses on critical parts of the network [Eusgeld et al., 2009], [Bompard et al., 2009], 
[Bier et al, 2007]. 
In this paper, an analysis of the vulnerability of the Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical 
transmission network (HVIET) is carried out for the identification of the groups of elements most 
critical with respect to the network connection topology. In [Cadini et al., 2009], the authors 
proposed the use of betweenness centrality of groups of nodes as importance measures. In this 
paper, the approach is extended to consider the betweenness centrality of groups of edges and the 
variation in network connection efficiency [Latora and Marchiori, 2001] for identifying the critical 
groups. For the type of system under study this point of view is more realistic since in power 
systems, transmission lines (edges) are more exposed to attacks than nodes (substations). 
The identification of the most critical groups of edges of different sizes in a network is a NP-
complete combinatorial problem, which may be effectively tackled by heuristic procedures, such as 
evolutionary search algorithms. In this paper, Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are used within a multi-
objective formulation of the search problem, in which the decision variables are the groups of edges 
and the objectives are to maximize the importance of the groups, while minimizing their cardinality. 
This formulation guides the search towards the identification of the most important single 
components, couples of components, triplets and so forth. In other words, the problem is a multi-
objective decision problem and the genetic algorithms are used to search for Pareto optimal 
solutions (i.e., non-dominated solutions): in this sense, several authors speak of multi-objective 
genetic algorithms, MOGA [Murata and Ishibuchi, 1995; Coello Coello et al., 2007]. 
The results are compared with those reported in [Rosato et al., 2006] and [Rocco et al., 2009]; in the 
first reference, the authors adopt a DC power flow to assess the behavior of the power system under 
a limited set of edges outages whereas in the second reference the most critical groups of edges are 
identified by evaluating the maximum flow in the power network, within a multiobjective 
formulation. Both papers try to model the network considering the physical phenomenon. In the 
case of [Rosato et al. 2006], they used a DC power flow, a simplified model that take into 
consideration the impedances of the network, the transmission line capacities and the load and 
generation nodes. In the approach proposed by [Rocco et al. 2009], a proxy of the power flow is 
used, by evaluating the maximum flow in the network: its value corresponds to the total load of the 
system. This approach requires in addition to the topology of the network, the capacity of the 
transmission lines, the load and generation nodes. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section 2 presents the measures used to quantify the 
importance of groups of edges. Section 3 presents the proposed optimization approach. In Section 4, 
the approach is applied to the Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical transmission network. 
Conclusions on the outcomes of the analysis are drawn in Section 5. 
 
2. Centrality measures 
The network system under analysis is modeled as a graph ( , )G V E  where V  represents the set of 
vertexes (or nodes) ( dim( )N V  is the number of nodes) and E  represents the set of edges ( , )i j  
( dim( )K E  is the number of edges). The graph is represented by its N N  adjacency 
(connection) matrix { }ija  whose entries are 1 if there is an edge joining nodes i  and j , 0 otherwise. 
Associated with each link ( , )i j  is a K K  matrix { }ij , describing the capacities of the links 
( , )i j . Additionally, a node is classified as a generating source (i.e., power source) or a load (i.e., 
power demand) or simply a junction node (neither generating nor demanding power). 
To evaluate the role played by the edges of the network with respect to its connectivity, two 
quantitative measures are considered in this paper. 
2.1 Group betweenness centrality measure 
Edge betweenness was first proposed by Girvan [Girvan and Newman, 2002] as a measure of 
centrality used to detect community structure in networks of various kinds. This measure is based 
on the idea that an edge is central if it is traversed by many of the shortest paths connecting pairs of 
nodes, from generation nodes to load nodes. Edge betweenness is a measure of the influence of an 
edge over the flow of information in the network, especially in cases where information flow 
follows the shortest available path. Note that this measure does not evaluate the magnitude of the 
flow through the shortest path. 
By generalizing this concept, the betweenness centrality of a group of edges, denoted by ( ),BC g  
can be defined as follows:  
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where g  is the subset of edges of the graph, and , ( )i js g  represents the number of geodesics (i.e., the 
shortest paths) connecting i  to j  that pass through .g  In other words, the group betweenness 
centrality measure indicates the proportion of geodesics connecting pairs of non-group members 
that pass through the group. In the above equation, the sum is taken over all pair of nodes. The 
measure is normalized by dividing by the theoretical maximum value. If there is more than one 
shortest path between a pair of nodes, each path is given equal weight such that the total weight of 
all of the paths is unity. Note that all the information required to evaluate this measure is contained 
in the adjacency matrix of the network. 
2.2 Global efficiency relative variation importance 
The global efficiency of the graph Ef(G) representing the network is defined as [Latora and 
Marchiori, 2001]: 
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where 1/ ijd  is the efficiency of the connection between nodes i  and j  in terms of the number of 
edges on the shortest path linking the two nodes. It relates the importance of an edge to the impact 
on the network transmission performance of losing to failure the edges of a group. The relative 
variation of the global efficiency due to the removal of a group g of edges is computed as the 
difference between the global efficiency of the network with all the edges of the group removed and 
the global efficiency of the original network, normalized to the latter value: (Ef(G)-Ef(G’)/ Ef(G)); 
G’=G-g. This value can be interpreted as a measure of importance of the group of edges removed 
[Crucitti et al., 2005]. 
As for the previous measure, all the information required to evaluate Ef(G) is contained in the 
adjacency matrix of the network. 
 
3. Multi-objective genetic algorithm approach  
 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are powerful heuristics that have been successfully used in optimization 
and search problems. The terminology adopted in GAs contains many terms borrowed from 
biology, suitably redefined to fit the algorithmic context.  
Thus, GAs operate on a set of (artificial) chromosomes, which are strings of numbers, generally 
sequences of binary digits (bits) 0 and 1, coding the values of the decision variables. The values of 
one or more objective functions in correspondence of the values of the decision variables of a 
chromosome, define the fitness of that chromosome. The GA search is performed by constructing a 
sequence of populations of chromosomes, the individuals of each population being the children of 
those of the previous population and the parents of those of the successive population.  
The initial population is generated by randomly sampling the bits of all the strings; at each step in 
the search sequence, the new population is obtained by probabilistically manipulating the strings of 
the old population with fitness-improving rules, which mimic genetic evolution. The search 
sequence continues until a pre-established optimality termination criterion is reached. The string 
manipulation consists in selecting and mating pairs of chromosomes in order to groom 
chromosomes of the next population. This is done by repeatedly performing on the strings the four 
fundamental operations of reproduction, crossover, replacement and mutation, all based on random 
sampling: the parents selection step determines the individuals which participate in the reproduction 
phase; reproduction itself allows the exchange of already existing genes whereas mutation 
introduces new genetic material; the substitution defines the individuals for the next population. 
This way of proceeding enables to efficiently arrive at optimal or near-optimal solutions. Since the 
initial population is generated at random, it is important to perform several runs in order to assess 
the convergence of the heuristic. As with any other heuristic, the approach cannot be claimed to 
converge for every problem setting.  
In the case of a multiobjective optimization problem, two or more possibly conflicting objective 
functions ( ),if   i = 1, 2,…, nf , must be evaluated in correspondence with each decision variable 
vector U  in the search space. In this case, the GA search proceeds by comparing the solutions in 
terms of the concepts of Pareto optimality and dominance [Goldberg, 1989]. The decision variable 
vectors which are not dominated by any other of a given set are called non-dominated with respect 
to this set while the decision variable vectors that are non-dominated within the entire search space 
are said to be Pareto optimal and constitute the so called Pareto optimal front, which is the object of 
the optimization. 
3.1 Genetic Algorithm for identifying critical groups 
Consider a network ( , )G V E  and one of the measure defined by (1) or (2). Let  
 1 2( , , , )KC x x x   (3) 
represent the importance measure selected when different edges are grouped, with 1ix   if edge i  
belongs to the group, 0ix   otherwise. For example, in a network with 3K   edges and using (1), 
(1,0,0)C  indicates the betweenness importance of the first edge alone; (0,0,1)C  indicates the 
importance of the third edge alone; (1,0,1)C  indicates the betweenness importance of the group 
made of the first and third edges. 
In a network with K  edges, the number of groups (single edges, pairs, triplets and so forth) that in 
principle can be formed is 2K . A complete analysis of all groups to find the most critical is 
therefore impractical for large networks [Zio and Golea, 2009]. This fact suggests devising 
appropriate heuristic procedures to solve the problem, as the one based on GA here proposed. 
To overcome this obstacle, the task of determining the most critical groups of edges can be framed 
as a multiobjective (MO) optimization problem with respect to the two following objectives: 
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with 1ix   if edge i  belongs to the group, 0ix   otherwise; thus 2 ( )f x  represents the cardinality 
of the group of edges. 
The need for introducing the second objective is due to the fact that, in general, the more edges in a 
group, the higher its impact on the network. Indeed, a search directed only by the importance of the 
groups (with no control on their sizes) would favor large groups, whose simultaneous failure or 
attack (in a security view) is however not likely (on the contrary, this is not so within cascading 
processes which can lead to large number of edges failing successively).. By defining the second 
objective, which favors small groups, the search is guided to finding the most critical (i.e., 
max 1( )f x ), preferably small-size groups, i.e., the single edges, pairs, triplets and so forth. 
Note that alternatively one could introduce the limit on the group size to a certain number, as a 
constraint of the single-objective minimization of eq. (4). Fixing the group size to a specific value 
as constraint would require analyzing the effects of different group sizes by repeating several times 
the single-objective problem solution with varying values of the constraint; on the contrary, the 
multi-objective approach by the introduction of the second objective allows us to obtain Pareto-
optimal solutions in a single run. 
In most typical applications of GAs, every proposal of solution, represented by the vector x  of the 
independent decision variables, is coded in a chromosome constituted by genes, each one coding 
one decision variable of x . Differently from typical applications, the decision variables 
1 2( , , , )Kx x x  of eq. (4) of the optimization problem considered in this paper are already in the 
form of a binary string; therefore, single-gene chromosomes are used, directly coding the 
composition of the group. The dimension of the chromosome is equal to the number of edges in the 
network. Table 1 shows two examples of chromosome-coding for a system of 10K   edges. 
 
Table 1. Examples of chromosome-coding of groups of edges in a network of 10 edges 
Chromosome coding (10 bits)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Corresponding edges in 
the group 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 4,7,9 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1,6,8,10 
 
4. The Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical transmission network 
The Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical transmission network (HVIET) can be represented by 
an undirected graph ( , )G V E  with 310N   nodes and 361K   edges (Figure 1). Three different 
types of nodes can be distinguished: source nodes S (where power is inserted in the network), load 
nodes L (where power is extracted from the network) and junction nodes J  (which are neither S nor 
L nodes). There are 97S   source nodes, 113L   load nodes and 100J   junction nodes. Some 
edges (14 over 361) are constituted by double lines; for the topological analysis carried out in this 
work, double lines are considered as providing a single edge of communication.  
Several topological properties have been analyzed on the HVIET network [Crucitti et al., 2004], 
[Tiriticco et al., 2006]. A more detailed analysis of the vulnerability has been performed by [Rosato 
et al., 2006], based on a model reproducing the power flow conditions of the network. The obtained 
results showed that “only a small number of nodes having a "functional" relevance for the network 
can be discovered through the topology analysis of its graph”. Finally, the authors remarked that 
“topological analysis and the simulation of the "functional" models (such as the DC power flow 
model, for the case of electrical networks) provide complementary information”. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Italian high-voltage transmission network, drawn using Pajek [Batagelj and Mrvar, 1998] 
A set of GAs has been implemented to identify the most critical groups of edges of different sizes in 
the network of Figure 1. Table 2 summarizes the details of the implementation of the GA operators 
previously described, along with a number of parameters that control the operation of the genetic 
algorithms such as the population size (i.e., the size of the evolving set of candidate solutions) and 
the number of generations (i.e., the duration of the evolution process). Five GA optimization runs 
were performed for identifying the critical groups with respect to betweenness centrality and five 
with respect to global efficiency relative variation importance, starting from different initial random 
populations. The number of solutions found at the end of each search was around 5-7 (i.e., 5-7 
different group sizes, from 1 to 5-7). A Pareto set was then obtained by selecting the non-dominated 
solutions among those reached in the different runs.  
Table 2: Multi-objective genetic algorithm parameters and rules 
Number of chromosomes 200 
Number of generations 800 
Selection Fit-Fit 
Replacement Children-parents 
Mutation probability 0.001 
Crossover probability 1 
Number of generations without elitist 
selection 
15 
Fraction of parents chosen with elitist 
selection 
0.25 
 
Table 3 provides the most vulnerable edges in the Pareto set found by the genetic algorithm MO 
search driven by the global efficiency relative variation: the edges 184-214 and 183-207, identified 
as critical for electrical transport, are also present in the groups of size five. Figure 2 shows the 
Pareto front approximation. Each point in the graph represents a group of critical edges. 
The drop in efficiency due to the removal of the two edges, individually, is -2.3% and -3.9%; when 
they are both removed, the drop is -7.6%, which confirms the importance of analyzing groups of 
elements. The rest of edges forming the groups of the Pareto set are located at the boundaries of the 
north side of the network, which is indicated as the most vulnerable part of the network system. 
Table 4 reports the most important groups of edges identified with respect to the betweenness 
centrality measure. The results show that the removal of the edges with high betweenness leads to 
the separation of groups from one another. Note that for the network under study, the most 
important groups contain edges that are physically concentrated in the central part of the network; 
failures of these divide the network in separate, isolated parts. 
 
Table 3. Pareto optimal results of the multi-objective search for global efficiency relative variation and the 
corresponding groups betweenness values 
 
Global efficiency 
relative variation - 
Pareto 
Group 
Size 
 
Edges out (from-to node) 
Group 
betweenness 
-49.5% 7 165-117 148-178 154-212 130-142 153-168 176-201 161-183 0.687 
-46.8% 6 165-117  154-212 130-142 153-168 176-201 161-183 0.652 
-38.7% 5  148-178  183-207 184-214 184-198 147-206 0.577 
-34.7% 4  153-183 161-179   184-213 206-147 0.505 
-29.6% 3  153-183 154-212 130-142    0.442 
-12.6% 2 152-219 148-178      0.194 
-6.6% 1 152-219       0.086 
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Figure 2. Pareto front approximation: Group Size vs Betweenness 
 
Table 4. Pareto optimal results of the multi-objective search for betweenness centrality groups and values of the 
efficiency variation of the corresponding edges 
 
Group 
betweenness - 
Pareto 
Group 
size 
 
Edges out (from-to node) 
Global efficiency 
relative variation 
0.758 7 153-168 144-160 154-194 128-212 117-201 185-238 183-207 -35.8% 
0.707 6 153-168 144-160 154-194 128-212 176-201 185-238  -33.9% 
0.65 5 153-168 144-160 154-194 128-212 176-201   -16.8% 
0.584 4 153-168 144-160 154-194 128-212    -15% 
0.504 3 153-168 144-160 154-194     -12.7% 
0.384 2 153-168 144-160      -4.9% 
0.258 1 153-168       -3.7% 
 
As a term of comparison, the detailed approach presented in [Rosato et al., 2006] recognizes that 
the edges critical for electrical transport are those connecting nodes 103, 117, 127, 184, 190 and 
214; these edges also form a subset of the screening results obtained in [Rocco et al., 2009] (Table 
5, columns 1-3). The results summarized in Table 5 show that the most critical groups identified in 
[Rocco et al., 2009] in terms of load shed are assembled around the group of edges 184-214, 183-
207, 103-127, 117-190. These edges are concentrated on the north-east side of the network in 
Figure 1, with edges 184-214 and 183-207 in the center of this area which has turned out to be the 
most vulnerable part of the network system according to the group measures considered in the 
multiobjective GA search. A significant drop in efficiency (-32.2%, Table 5, column 5, of a 
maximum of -34.7%, Table 3, column 1) was obtained in the case of interdiction of the edges 
composing the most important group of size four in terms of load shed, leading to the conclusion 
that the failure of the edges affects the network both from a structural and functional point of view.  
The global efficiency relative variation results of Table 5 show a significant drop of the efficiency 
of the network for the most critical groups identified, of size four to seven. This leads to the 
conclusion that the removal of specific edges redirects the flow towards the shortest topological 
paths.  
 
Table 5. Pareto optimal results of the multiobjective search, and corresponding group betweenness and global efficiency 
relative variation 
Load 
Shed-
Pareto 
Group 
Size 
 
Edges out (from-to node) 
Group 
betweenness 
Global 
efficiency 
relative 
variation 
26% 7 106-167 103-127 184-214 183-207 117-190 158-261 191-226 0.52 -36.9% 
23% 6 106-167 103-127 184-214 183-207 117-190 158-261  0.49 -34.9% 
21% 5 106-167 103-127 184-214 183-207 117-190   0.47 -33.4% 
16% 4  103-127 184-214 183-207 117-190   0.45 -32.2% 
12% 3  103-127 184-214 183-207    0.42 -8.4% 
8% 2  103-127 184-214     0.16 -2.8% 
4% 1 106-167       0.025 -1.5% 
 
Finally, the outcomes of the analysis of the critical groups of edges are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained in [Rosato et al., 2006]: a limited number of “central” edges with "functional" relevance 
for the network is discovered through the topological analysis of its graph. Also, the most critical 
groups of edges identified in [Rocco et al., 2009] in terms of the load shed and those identified in 
this paper with respect to the edge betweenness expand around a core of edges, which can be 
subject to further analysis by simulation of AC/DC load flow. 
On the other hand, differences in the results exist due to the different model assumptions driving the 
two models. In [Rocco et al., 2009], the maximum flow reduction is used as performance function 
for carrying out an analysis which is a proxy of the physical analysis with additional information 
requirements. The search is done aiming at the minimum set of edges to interdict for maximizing 
the load shed. Note that the group of size four could be considered a fourth-order cut set for the 
north-east side of the network.  In this view, the reason why the critical group search performed in 
this paper does not identify edges 117-190 as critical is explained by the fact that these nodes are 
high-generation capacity nodes and as such they are identified as critical in [Rocco et al., 2009]: on 
the contrary, the measures (1) and (2) driving the criticality search performed in this paper do not 
consider capacity. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a GA-based procedure for the vulnerability analysis of a network system has been 
devised to identify the most critical groups of edges of different sizes in the network. The GA 
search for the most important groups has been framed as a multi-objective optimization problem 
whose decision variables are the edge group compositions and the objectives are the maximization 
of the importance of the groups and the minimization of group cardinality.  
The Italian high-voltage electrical transmission network (HVIET) has been taken as case study for 
the analysis of the importance of groups of edges considering the network structure and flow. The 
group betweenness centrality measure and the global efficiency relative variation have been used as 
importance indicators to underline the structural vulnerabilities. The results have been compared 
with the results of two approaches previously presented in the literature, obtained from a more 
realistic functional vulnerability analysis of the network: one based on the evaluation of the load 
flow through a DC load flow model; the other using the maximum flow in the network, as a proxy 
of the real load flow. It has been shown that the proposed approach requires minimum information 
of the network (only the topology of the network) and leads to the identification of a number of 
critical edges that have „functional‟ relevance and provides complementary information, which 
could be used as a preliminary screening analysis. 
As a general remark, the proposed procedure allows for a preliminary analysis for identifying 
groups of critical edges by analyzing only the topology of the network. This requires a minimum of 
information. The analysis produces a set of critical elements that must be analyzed by appropriate 
procedures that model the physical phenomenon of the network. The results suggest that a 
preliminary set of critical edges can be provided by the proposed approach. For obtaining realistic 
insights on the robustness and vulnerability of realistic electrical transmission systems to faults and 
attacks, the analysis focused on the topological features of the network must be expanded to include 
also additional physical characteristics. In this respect, work is currently undergoing in establishing 
effective ways of bringing different physical characteristics into the topological analysis, e.g. the 
reliability and electrical characteristics of the transmission edges in a power network. 
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